Abstract
Introduction
Coffee exporting countries are currently in a state of crisis. In February 2002 world coffee prices were at their lowest levels since the 1930's, matching the great hog price rout of 1998. One difference, however, is that hog prices rebounded quickly, while coffee prices have remained near lows ( Figure 1 ). In addition, price risk for coffee appears greater in the smaller export countries than in the overall sector ( Figure 2 ).
Historically low coffee prices coupled with substantial price volatility puts less developed countries (LDCs) relying on coffee exports at risk. The potential effects of not developing an effective price risk management program can be devastating. However, selecting among various risk management strategies can be challenging. The impacts of alternative risk management strategies have been debated for decades, and conclusions have often turned on researchers' initial assumptions as to the primary objective of incountry LDC policy makers. Until the mid 1980's the focus tended to be on various supply management schemes for addressing price risk issues for LDCs. Measures of producer and consumer welfare effects from these programs varied depending on overall policy objectives. For example, in 1969 Massell assumed that the policy objective of LDCs was to completely stabilize prices, and that this could be achieved through the public management of stocks. He concluded that a complete price stabilization policy would result in a gain to producers, but a loss to consumers.
In 1981 Newberry and Stiglitz argued that complete stabilization was not feasible, and examined the impacts of reducing, but not eliminating, price volatility for export commodities. They concluded that reducing price volatility also reduces producer incomes, while leaving consumers relatively unaffected. The policy makers' challenge was to determine whether lower producer incomes justified the overall reduction in price risk. In other words, did the benefits of reduced price dispersion more than offset the costs of lower producer incomes?
By the mid 1980's, attention began to focus on alternative ways to manage export price risk. In 1985 Gemmill compared the relative costs and benefits of managing buffer stocks with the direct use of forward contract arrangements by individual producers.
Gemmill's work is of particular interest because it looked at individual contract arrangements as an alternative to more common supply management schemes, and because coffee was one of the commodities studied. He estimated both country-bycountry and total world costs and benefits associated with managing international buffer stocks. Based on earlier work by Nguyen (1980) , Gemmill estimated baseline costs associated with maintaining a buffer stocks program. He then compared the results to the individual country and total market costs and benefits associated with individual producer forward pricing. The forward pricing "rule" (i.e., the amount of production priced in the forward market) was estimated in a mean/variance type model where an individual country's export income variance was minimized given target levels of income.
The research results varied across both commodities and countries. In the case of coffee, Gemmill found that at the world level the total costs of maintaining a buffer stocks program was significantly higher than the benefits accrued. Thus, he found forward trading to be a more cost-effective risk management strategy. However, for three of the six coffee exporting countries examined forward contracting by domestic producers did not achieve as high a benefit-risk ratio as could be achieved with a local buffer stocks program. He found forward contracting was more cost effective, but also resulted in less total risk reduction.
Over the past several years LDCs appear to be moving away from supply management schemes and in the direction of market based solutions for managing price risk. Morgan, Rayner, and Vaillant (1999) note that LDCs have enacted policy reforms that increase the attractiveness of forward contracts as a risk management strategy.
Recent international agreements liberalizing trade make supply control policies unacceptable mechanisms, and market based strategies for risk reduction, including forward contracting and hedging in futures markets, are being increasingly considered as alternatives.
LDC use of Futures Markets
According to Morgan et. al, an important decision in LDC use of futures markets is determining whether LDCs should hedge in markets already in existence in developed countries, or develop domestic futures markets. They argue this decision turns on whether it is more cost-effective to use an established market and attempt to manage not only the price risk of the export commodity, but also the exchange rate risk between the developed country and the LDC, or whether the substantial costs associated with developing both the physical infrastructure and the regulatory and trading environment necessary to launch a successful exchange should be incurred in order to develop trade in futures contracts priced in the export country's home currency.
1,2
Gemmill's 1985 research assumed that forward contracts were available and accessible to LDC producers. To the extent forward contracts are available to LDC producers for the commodities he studied (sugar, coca, and coffee), they likely exist only because futures contracts for those commodities exist. However, the futures contracts trade in developed countries, and are not priced in producers' domestic currencies. If forward contracts are actively offered to LDC producers, the contractor is promising to pay a specific price on a future date in local currency, and likely hedging the associated price risk in another currency.
3 In the case of many coffee-producing markets, the exchange rate risk cannot be hedged directly. Thus, the strategy suggested by Morgan et Historically we have not thought much about the impact of speculative behavior on price action. In fact, until a decade or so ago, it was simply assumed that the more traders in the market, the more efficient the market was at discovering price, regardless of the relative composition of speculators to hedgers. However, the coffee market (like cocoa and sugar) is unique in that U.S. commercial traders have become both increasingly concentrated and more vertically integrated, potentially reducing their need for price risk management. This may have resulted in LDCs representing a larger portion of the commercial volume, with total commercial activity falling as a percent of total market activity.
Objectives
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationships between the New York coffee futures market and cash markets in two Latin American LDCs. In contrast to
Morgan et. al, the intent is to determine if incentives might exist for LDC futures market development even when exchange rate risk is not the driving factor. For example, if futures trading on a foreign exchange increases price risk in a LDC cash market (i.e., increases cash market price volatility), LDC policy makers may decide to encourage local exchange development in order to maximize access by domestic producers and merchandisers to futures market forward pricing opportunities as a vehicle for managing domestic income stability. As such, the specific objectives here are to 1) determine whether the New York futures contract for coffee offers hedging opportunities for Latin
American coffee market participants, and 2) examine the relationship between futures trade composition in New York and the volatility of coffee prices in Latin American cash markets.
The first objective is addressed using cointegration analysis. The issue is whether there is efficient information flow between the New York futures market and Latin
American cash markets for coffee, and whether the basis risk associated with a hedge is less than the cash price risk faced by an un-hedged producer. 10 If the futures and cash markets are not cointegrated, it suggests that basis levels behave in a non-stationary way, and there is no guarantee that basis risk is less than actual cash price risk.
10 Contrary to some interpretations of cointegration results, we do not view the cointegration results as a test of overall market efficiency. Rather, it is a test of relative price efficiency between the two markets. For our purpose, a rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegration implies that relevant information is getting priced similarly in both markets, suggesting that futures and cash markets are functioning in a manner that allows the futures market to be used as a risk management vehicle for cash market participants.
The second objective is tackled using a combination of a regression model that examines the impact of futures market composition on futures price volatility, and results from evaluating the residual behavior from the cointegration equations. The results allow discussion of the potential impact of speculative market activity on futures volatility, and the extent to which futures market volatility corresponds to volatility in LDC cash markets.
Data
Data for the cointegration analysis span March 1990 through December 2001.
Average monthly New York coffee futures prices and monthly export prices for
Honduras and Guatemala were used. 
Cointegration Methodology and Results
Cointegration has become a standard technique for evaluating the relative performance of two related markets (Schroeder and Goodwin (1991) , Zapata and Fortenbery (1996) , Zapata (1993, 1997) ). One reason for the popularity of cointegration analysis over the last decade is its ability to identify the long run equilibrium relationship between two markets, while allowing for deviations from the equilibrium relationship in the short run.
According to Labys and Granger (1970) , most commodity futures prices approximate stochastic processes, but that does not mean they are not pricing new market countries in Latin America (and in fact the entire Western Hemisphere), and both rely heavily on agricultural exports for export income. For example, agricultural exports represent 67 percent of total Guatemalan exports, with coffee, sugar and bananas being the primary commodities exported. Honduras also relies primarily on agricultural exports for trade income generation, with coffee representing 45 percent of total agricultural exports (CIA, 2002 Tests for cointegration in coffee prices were conducted via the maximum likelihood approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990) . They proposed that tests of cointegration should be based on a fully specified error-correction model (ECM). The error correction model for series integrated of order one takes the form:
In this specification, e t is NID (0,Λ), Γ 1 ,…,Γ k-1 , ∏, ∅, Λ are parameters to be estimated, ∆ = 1-L where L is the lag operator, D is a matrix of non-stochastic variables (i.e., dummies, etc.), and t= 1,2,…,T.
Cointegration is tested by examining the rank of ∏. If the rank of ∏ is zero, there is no cointegration, and no long run equilibrium relationship exists between the variables considered. If the rank of ∏ is between zero and p, where p is the number of variables in the system, then there is cointegration, with the number of cointegrating relations defined by the rank of ∏. In testing for cointegration the hypothesis of interest is H 0 : ∏ = αβ′, where α and β are p x r matrices, β is the cointegrating vector, α is the weight vector that measures the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium, and r is the number of cointegrating relations.
To estimate β, all terms but β are eliminated from the likelihood function (Johansen, 1988) :
This is done by regressing ∆Y t and Y t-k on their lagged differences. The Γ parameters are eliminated, and the resulting system has a dependent variable R 0t (the residuals from a regression of ∆Y t on lagged ∆ Y t 's) and independent variable R kt (the residuals from regressing Y t-k on lagged ∆Y t 's). Next, letting S ij = T The lag-length of the error-correction model (ECM) is chosen by sequentially testing lags in a VAR in levels (up to maximum of 10 lags) and using a modified likelihood ratio test to select the appropriate lag (Sims, 1980) . The ECM is estimated at the optimum lag length and the residuals tested for autocorrelation to assure model adequacy. Impulse response functions (Lukepohl, 1993) are estimated for the ECM with the cointegrating restrictions imposed (Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992) . corn and soybean markets, Fortenbery and Zapata (1973) found that futures price changes were completely reflected in cash prices within in 1 to 3 days. 15 The Honduran coffee market takes up to six months to completely respond to coffee price changes in the New York futures market. In the case of Guatemala, the cash price response to a shock in the New York futures price is identical to the response in Honduras but the impulse response appears as a monotonically increasing function that settles at a new equilibrium slightly above the equilibrium of the Honduran export price. When the Guatemalan export price is shocked the response of the New York futures price is flat and close to zero. Guatemalan export prices decline quickly and almost monotonically, but remain positive throughout the adjustment period until they settle at basically the same equilibrium level that the futures prices do. It appears from the impulse responses that New York futures prices have a strong effect on Honduran and Guatemalan export prices, and that these prices settle at a new equilibrium level following a change in futures price. However, futures prices show only a minimal reaction to changes in either cash price series.
Tests for ARCH effects in the model residuals suggest that not only are price levels in Guatemala and Honduras affected by changes in futures prices, but cash price variances are also affected by futures market price activity. ARCH tests reveal significant (5% level of significance) ARCH(6) and ARCH(2) effects from the residuals of the futures price ECM models for Honduras and Guatemala, respectively.
price levels) we know from the cointegration impulse response functions that the New York coffee futures market is serving as the point of initial price discovery, and that the cash markets considered are responding to the futures market price changes. As such, average prices in both markets are linked. Further, the detection of ARCH behavior in the futures price equations suggests that cash price variances are also impacted by futures market activity. What we do not know is whether overall price risk in the cash markets is increased, decreased, or unaffected by trading activity in the futures market. If it is decreased or unaffected, then the futures market serves as a total price risk reducing vehicle, and a strong argument can be made that it enhances overall market performance.
From a policy perspective, this suggests that use of the foreign futures market to hedge by any part of the LDC coffee sector likely reduces overall sector income instability relative to no LDC hedging activity.
However, if futures market activity increases instability in cash prices, the case is less clear. To be of net benefit, the futures market would need to provide hedgers with full coverage of the risk introduced by the futures market itself, and also reduce some part of the price risk that would exist in the cash market in the absence of futures. 17 In addition, cash market participants who do not directly hedge (small scale producers, merchandisers unable or unwilling to fund a margin account in foreign currency, etc.)
would need access to other forward market opportunities, or income instability in the 17 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, if futures market activity affects volatility in both cash and futures markets in a similar fashion, optimal hedge ratios do not change, and market agents who hedge enjoy the same level of risk protection as would be the case if futures activity did not adversely impact volatility (this of course assigns a minimal cost to the potential for increased activity in the futures margin account). However, for market agents unable to hedge on a foreign futures exchange, an increase in price volatility increases their price risk, and if there is not a local mechanism for managing this increased risk, an LDC policy makers ability to rely on market contracts (as suggested by Gimmel and Morgan et. al) as a part of an income stabilization policy is compromised.
coffee sector could actually be higher than it would be without a futures market at all regardless of whether some market agents hedge.
Trader Composition Tests
If Witherspoon's hypothesis is correct, and excessive speculation in the futures market results in increased cash price volatility even in markets that are cointegrated, then LDC policy makers need not only be worried about whether a developed country's futures market provides hedging opportunities to LDC producers/exporters, but also whether trade activity in the developed futures market impacts cash price risk and adversely affects market participants not able to hedge on a foreign futures exchange. If speculators tend to be technical traders, meaning they generate their price expectations purely from past price action and trade volume, and do not monitor or account for underlying fundamental supply/demand conditions in the markets they trade, they may simply be noise traders, and generating trade decisions based on noise may exacerbate the level of market noise. Put simply, if prices falling over a number of days leads speculators to believe that prices will continue to fall, they may become aggressive sellers, pushing the market to even lower levels, when in fact a careful analysis of market fundamentals would lead one to believe price should go no lower. When fundamentals finally impact price levels, prices rebound, but the resulting trading range is greater than would be the case if no noise trading occurred.
To test the relationship between speculative activity and volatility in coffee markets, we use weekly data to estimate the following model: As noted earlier, the model above clearly understates speculative activity since it does not account for speculative positions held by non-reporting traders, or speculative activity by commercial traders. As such, it measures the lower limit of speculative impacts on price volatility. The results of estimating equation 8 are presented in Table   2 . 18 Note that the impact of noncommercial traders on futures price volatility is significant. Further, because of the recursive nature of equation 8, it appears that changes in market composition are followed by changes in price volatility. Increases in both the percent of total long open interest and the percent of total short open interest accounted for by speculators is followed by increased price volatility in the futures market. An increase in non-commercial spreading also appears to result in increased futures price volatility. In addition, the futures price is significant suggesting that price risk increases as prices increase.
The market share of the largest traders does not affect the level of market volatility. Neither the long nor short four-trader concentration is significant in equation 8.
Combining the evidence from Table 2 with the detection of ARCH effects in the futures price equations earlier provides evidence that the level of futures market speculation may impact cash price volatility. Specifically, the more speculators dominate trade activity in the New York coffee futures market, the greater the cash price volatility faced by LDC coffee market agents. This provides a challenge to LDC policy makers interested in using forward contracting as a vehicle in stabilizing agricultural sector incomes in coffee producing countries. For market agents sophisticated and large enough to hedge directly on a foreign futures exchange, hedging will likely reduce overall price 18 The results of unit root tests for the price series used in the cointegration analysis earlier confirmed the existence of a unit root in monthly average futures prices. We also fail to reject the existence of a unit root in weekly average prices used in this analysis. However, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the residuals from equation 8 is rejected at the 1 percent level.
risk. However, for a large part of the LDC population, opportunities to hedge directly on foreign exchanges may not exist. If this group represents a large enough share of the LDC coffee sector, sector-wide incomes may be less stable than if there were no coffee futures market at all. For LDC policy makers focused on income stability, providing access to price risk management opportunities for all sector participants will be critical to reducing income instability. One potential option is to develop a local futures exchange.
Critical to the success of any local futures exchange, however, will be the ability to generate sufficient volume to insure a liquid market.
Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that the New York coffee futures market currently serves as the center for price discovery in Latin American coffee exporting countries.
Further, the failure to reject cointegration between the futures and cash markets considered suggests that the futures contracts in New York offer hedging opportunities to coffee sector participants in Central America. The long adjustment period between futures and cash price changes does suggest that hedging may only be risk efficient for relatively long planning horizons.
While the coffee futures market appears to offer risk management opportunities to participants in the cash market, it also appears that increased speculative activity increases the price risk faced by cash market participants. For hedgers this my not be important, but for small producers and merchandisers unable to access a foreign futures exchange (either because of scale of operation or because of an inability to establish and manage a margin account in the US), overall risk exposure may increase as speculative activity increases in the futures market. As such, it is not clear whether a locally important product trading on a foreign futures exchange provides the environment necessary to stabilize local incomes through market based contracting, even ignoring exchange rate risk.
Earlier work has suggested that hedging provides an alternative to supply management strategies in managing price risk for export commodities in LDCs, and therefore a strategy for stabilizing domestic incomes. It was further argued that the choice between hedging a LDC export commodity on an established exchange in a developed country or developing a local futures contract priced in the domestic currency hinged on a comparison of the relative costs of either managing exchange rate risk through a direct hedge, or incurring exchange rate risk when local currencies are not represented by traded futures, with the relatively high costs of developing the infrastructure and regulatory environment necessary to develop a successful local futures market. The research here suggests that there are additional costs to consider. We show that even when exchange rate risk does not negate the risk management benefits from using a foreign futures contract, other costs may exist. If activity in the foreign futures market has a destabilizing impact on LDC cash prices, additional incentives exist to develop local trade environments.
The development of local LDC futures exchanges can mitigate the exchange rate risk faced by direct hedgers, may transmit price changes from futures to local cash markets more quickly if the current time lags are a result of frictions in information flow from New York to LDC cash markets, and increase access to forward pricing opportunities for that segment not able to hedge directly on a foreign futures exchange.
However, generating sufficient trade volume will be critical to the success of a local futures exchange. Neither the work here nor the previous work cited here has addressed this important topic directly.
Note that this paper does not conclude that excessive speculation exists in the coffee market, but does provide some initial evidence pointing in that direction. Before definitive recommendations can be made relative to LDC development of local futures markets, three points need further clarification. First, a specific test of variance causality between futures and cash prices needs to be considered and tested. While we find correlation between futures market composition and cash price volatility, we do not explicitly test for causality in variance, a subject of future research. Second, perhaps using Witherspoon's theoretical formulation, explicit tests need to be conducted to determine the optimal threshold of speculative activity. At what point does the speculative/commercial trade interest become unbalanced, resulting in excessive speculation? Third, if a market is determined to be experiencing excessive speculation, one must determine that any policy choices focused on addressing the problem (such as speculative position limits, limits on concentration by individual traders, etc.) do not impose costs that exceed the cost of excessive speculation. For example, restrictions on speculative activity that result in a significant reduction in market liquidity may impose costs that exceed those associated with too much speculation. The above three points are the current subject of additional work. 
